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And We Even Teach
CARL B. RUBIN*
You know what is the toughest task for a trial judge? It is teaching.
You know what is the most satisfying task for a trial judge? It is teaching.
With some frequency, I am called upon to instruct a small group of people
in principles of law. They are collectively known as juries. Instructing
them is different. When you entered law school, you already had an
undergraduate degree. When you attended the classes on torts, you spent
one semester of anywhere from three to five hours per week learning the
principles that apply to torts.
When I instruct jurors, I know that they will have, on the average, a
high school education and perhaps one year of college. I do not have a full
semester to instruct them on the intricacies of torts; I have perhaps twenty
or thirty minutes. For example, you may have spent several sessions on the
concept of "proximate cause." When I instruct a jury, the individual jurors
may never have heard of proximate cause, and I am confronted, in most
instances, with a legalistic definition that they may not understand. This is
one of the inherent problems: lawyers and judges speak a unique language.
We understand each other and we understand that many of the terms we
use are in fact shorthand. A juror does not speak the language and is
unacquainted with the concepts that lie behind the shorthand.
This task is not overwhelming and indeed, in my opinion, it is the
single most important thing that a trial judge must do. A confused jury is
the equivalent of a loose cannon: there is no telling what a confused jury
may do, and their actions may or may not be correctable. A properly
instructed jury is the goal. It does not matter then how that jury decides. If
they understand the problems with which they are confronted, their
decision in almost all instances is supportable.
When this basic problem occurred to me many years ago, I attempted
to establish a procedure that would minimize jury confusion. The basis of
the system is a collection of a thousand jury instructions with a consistent
and identifiable numbering system. Instructions are available to counsel for
inspection in advance of trial. I believe jury instructions should be in
writing. After they are read at the conclusion of final argument, they
should be sent to the jury room with an index. This will enable all jurors to
read them and in the event of a disagreement as to what I said, determine
the specific instruction in question.
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If I might digress, I would like to point out that I am currently
experimenting with the use of computer monitors to display the instructions
as they are read. My courtroom in Cincinnati is equipped with ten
computer monitors through which we may display any written document. I
believe that presenting instructions to two of the senses, both sight and
hearing, will enhance the understanding of the viewer. One example is the
term "proximate." Most jurors are unfamiliar with that term and if they
only hear it, they may well confuse it with "approximate." An approximate
cause is a totally different concept than a proximate cause. I have, on
occasion, given each juror a copy of the instructions in order that the juror
may follow while the instructions are being read.
Instructions in writing can always be available to attorneys. They are
now also obtainable on computer disks. An attorney need only present a
blank disk, and that attorney will have available all of my instructions with
no charge and with the elapse of very little time. I believe that most law
firms in Cincinnati have my instructions, and this results in a great deal of
saved time. If there are trial instructions that a lawyer wishes me to give,
he need only refer to them by number. I welcome suggested instructions
from either side so long as there is authority cited. It really makes no sense
to cite me my own boilerplate or to quote instructions that I have given in
the past. All counsel need do is refer to that instruction by number and I
will consider it. I make every effort to have my tentative instructions
available for distribution by the end of the plaintiff's case. If the plaintiff
elects to dismiss certain causes of action, or if I sustain a motion for
directed verdict, jury instructions on those causes are irrelevant.
My instructions also contain annotations. I have always had the
concern that an appellate panel may say, "Where in the world did he get
that concept of law?" If I have a citation to a court of appeals or the
Supreme Court of the United States, the question is answered. I try not to
cite decisions of the court of appeals of another circuit, although on
occasion in the absence of any Sixth Circuit law available, I have done so.
I will utilize decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court or Ohio appellate courts
in diversity cases. I will not rely on courts of another state unless that law
is involved.
The ultimate question, of course, is, "Have these efforts proved
successful?" If a statistical basis would bear upon that question, I would
point out that in twenty-three years as a federal judge, I have probably
presided at over 500 jury trials. I have never kept an exact count, but I
know that I have set aside fewer than five verdicts in that time, and I have
set aside verdicts or granted remittiturs in less than ten cases in that time.
The proof of the pudding, it is said, is in the eating.
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